Monday, 21 March 2011

Micro-cap stocks (IWM) are behaving far more independently of macro risk than might be expected

The basic proposition in this article is that there has been significant evidence (admittedly of a rather technical nature), demonstrated during recent market "difficulties", that there is considerable relative strength for the Russell 2000,the US micro-cap index, in comparison to the larger cap index the $S&P 500.

After the tumultuous conditions across most asset classes over the last week or so, there are some interesting patterns emerging which point to the fact that the micro-cap stocks are behaving far more independently of macro risk than might be expected. In fact there is evidence going back to September 2010 that suggests that there is an asymmetry in the performance of IWM and SPY (I shall use the two ETF’s IWM and SPY as surrogates for the cash indices).

One of the features of this asymmetry is that, during recent months, the beta value of IWM has been increasing when the overall market is performing well and has been decreasing when the overall equity markets are suffering from risk aversion. Based on a rolling 20 day linear regression the readings for beta (i.e. the gradient of the linear regression) were moving up towards a peak of about 1.8 during the strong upward impulse in prices during the latter part of 2010 and the first few weeks of 2011, and, during the recent price retreat, the beta value has declined sharply with a reading on Friday of just 1.14. This is not what one normally expects to see, as will be discussed below.

The chart below captures the relative price performance of three major US equity indices since September of 2010. The Russell 2000 has delivered a return of 25%, whereas the S&P 500 has returned 16% and the DJIA about 14%.

Significantly the recent sell-off has been more severe for the large cap indices than for the 2000 smallest stocks that are traded on US exchanges and which are the constituents of IWM.



A second technique to illustrate the recent decline in the correlation or co-movement of IWM and SPY is to track the correlation between the daily price changes of each index via a linear regression. The regression is based on daily changes in each index and a 20 day sampling is rolled across the complete data set for the last two years (500 data points)

The chart below shows that the square of the correlation coefficient (or R squared) for the most recent 20 day period which ended last Friday was 0.78 and, more typically over the extended period of two years, the R squared value has had an average reading of 0.86.

In essence what is being demonstrated statistically is that there has been a looser coupling of the daily movements in the two indices and that, somewhat surprisingly, this coincides with the recent volatility and sell-off in the overall market.



The next chart illustrates the degree of co-movement between SPY and the AUD/JPY cross rate which can act as a very good barometer of macro risk and which in turn can act as a driver as well as a reflection of the major shifts in asset allocation by large funds and asset managers.

The R squared value for the associated movements of SPY and AUD/JPY revealed on the chart is 0.45 which is fairly typical of the degree of correlation exhibited over the last two years. The actual 20 day rolling coefficient value for last Friday was 0.67 - in line with the typical performance between these two instruments - and also one of the most pronounced correlations between any FX pair and a major global equity index.

The manner in which these two asset classes move together is a surface manifestation of the underlying inter-dependent nature of large allocation decisions by global fund managers to both risk on/off currency plays and risk on/off equity (and commodity) plays.



The remaining chart for today’s analysis illustrates the much weaker co-movement between the micro-cap stocks (as represented by the daily changes in IWM over the last twenty trading sessions) and the daily changes in AUD/JPY.

The R squared value of just greater than 0.2, which is indicative of a coefficient of correlation of around 0.45, is not only half the value observed above for the SPY and AUD/JPY correlation, but also from an historical perspective is also considerably below the average value for the R squared value (over the last two years) which is approximately 0.5.



The conclusions that I am drawing from this hopefully not too statistically arcane approach are as follows:

1. Since the micro-cap stocks are showing less tendency to track the larger cap indices when the overall market and risk appetite are in retreat, there is evidence of a de-coupling between the larger macro risk environment and the performance of the micro caps. This is a surprising result as it indicates that when the large caps are getting beaten down the most, the propensity of fund managers to liquidate long positions in the micro caps is not taking place.

2. The large structured trades (often implemented via complex inter-market algorithms) where ongoing adjustments in large futures trades in the S&P 500, and large movements in the SPY exchange traded fund, and the FX market are very closely inter-twined, are not being seen recently in the behavior of the micro caps.

3. There has not been evidence of any liquidity panic in the US equity market despite the recent turmoil, which is largely a by-product of the almost daily injections of several billions by the Fed via its open market operations activities. In less liquid market conditions, where funds are keen not to be exposed to liquidation difficulties, there would be a tendency to avoid the smaller cap issues as they will tend to more difficult to sell when managers in general are heading for the exits.

4. One could also make the case that what is becoming evident might be a variation on the "Long tail" thesis which has been expressed in relation to new business models for mass distribution of companies like Amazon and Netflix. The key idea is that, just as with books and DVD’s, the less popular stocks are now more accessible and less dependent for their level of demand on the activities of large nodes in the market network. This also has, as a consequence, the benefit that smaller stocks will be less exposed to the rapid re-allocation shifts executed by the larger nodes (i.e. prop trading desks and quant funds) in the market network.

Tuesday, 15 March 2011

Seismic rumblings under Mount Fuji

MAP 6.2 2011/03/15 13:31:46 35.300 138.700 10.0 EASTERN HONSHU, JAPAN

Keynes RIP

To paraphrase one of the better known aphorisms of JM Keynes

If you hold an asset which is well represented on the public balance sheet for long enough you will die before it defaults.

Risk management revisited

Oxymoron = risk management

Risk management

The key word you do not want to hear from someone trained and respectably qualified in the practice of risk management " 'Oops"

Wednesday, 2 March 2011

Spiking oil, gold and a rather uncomfortable looking Fed chairman

Yesterday was decidedly not a good day for the animal spirits as most risk assets spent the day spiraling downwards.

Seen below is the 240 minute chart for the e-Mini S&P 500 futures (March 2011 contract) which provides a very clear illustration of yesterday’s (and other recent) plunges, and also the chart indicates a clear barrier which will need to be overcome in coming sessions at the 1310 level.



I spent part of yesterday watching the testimony of Ben Bernanke before the Senate Banking committee. The overall impression was of someone who found the questioning at times tedious, and at other times awkward. His demeanor, at least from this writer's perspective, could best be described as uncomfortable.

He made some rather remarkable comments in response to what, from time to time, were some very good questions put to him by members of the committee. One of my favorites was when he stated that he did not think it would be a good idea for the US to default on its debts when he was asked about the consequences of not raising the debt ceiling...that was rather reassuring!

The central theme of his remarks, and he came back to the point several times, was that the efficacy of QE2 should be judged primarily on its demonstrated ability to lift equity prices and thus avoid asset deflation. Given that the S&P 500 has doubled in the last two years he would seem to have been vindicated. However, as a side effect (not an entirely unintended consequence) of QE and ZIRP, it has to be clearly acknowledged that the US dollar is particularly weak at present in a global economy where rising commodity prices are ensuring that many nations are suffering from rising inflation. And that could get much worse if the events in North Africa and the Middle East continue to push Brent Crude and WTI further into triple digit territory.

In the fullness of time it could well become manifest that Chairman Bernanke has been following an imprudent course. His belief, and the received wisdom of many mainstream economists, that the US will somehow stay immune from higher input prices, including food and energy, could well turn out to have been a momentously significant misjudgment.

Also noteworthy was his firm reassurance, when interrogated on the matter, that the Fed has not actually been monetizing the debt of the US when it keeps taking hundreds of billions of US Treasuries onto its balance sheet. Just how he was able to say that quite so blithely remains a bit worrying. His rejoinder to this allegation, expressed somewhat diffidently, was to articulate his long term plan to sterilize the present QE related accommodations by eventually selling all of this Treasury paper back to the private sector.

Even for an optimist the best that could be said of this exit strategy is to express the hope that this procedure will work out as smoothly as he seemed to be suggesting. For a realist, the preferred approach would be, if not already doing so, to begin investing in a variety of inflation hedges including ETF's which provide exposure to commodities (e.g. DBB, GLD, DBC, REMX etc.) and also, in the longer term to be considering instruments which move in the opposite direction to the prices of long term US Treasuries such as TBT, which moves up as yields move up.

As Dr. Bernanke repeatedly pointed out in his testimony, higher yields on the mountain of US debt would be very troublesome for the US public balance sheet. It will be just as troublesome for those holders of longer term UST's that either want, or have, to sell those notes and bonds in the secondary market.